

TENTH EDITION

CORPORATE

Theory and Practice

STEVE LUMBY

AND: CHRIS JONES



CORPORATE FINANCE

Theory & Practice

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Theory and Practice

STEVE LUMBY

CHRIS JONES



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
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Steve Lumby has been involved with teaching corporate finance over many years, in both universities and business schools. He is a former Managing Director of the LCA Business School. After five years in industry with the H.J. Heinz Company, he spent several years lecturing and researching in corporate finance at the London School of Economics. He has also held teaching posts at both King's College (University of London) and at Brunel University, and was a specialist advisor on finance to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Energy. His current appointment is as a Strategic Financial Management Module Leader for the University of London's Masters Professional Accountancy qualification.

Chris Jones has lectured in accounting and finance for over 30 years since leaving Arthur Young. He has now retired from his position as Principal Lecturer in Accounting and Finance at Sheffield Hallam University.

PREFACE

There is a popular feeling that 'theory' is opposed to practice and the merits lie with 'practice'. This is a false conclusion, based on a false supposition. If practice has long been successful and does not conform to theory, the theory is bad and in need of revision.... The distinction should not be between theory and practice; it should be between good theory and bad theory, between good practice and bad practice.... Practice is brick; theory is mortar. Both are essential and both must be good if we are to erect a worthy structure.

D. PAARLBERG, GREAT MYTHS OF ECONOMICS (1968) NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY

The description in plain language will be a criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached.

W. HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY (2007) HARPER PERENNIAL MODERN CLASSICS (REPRINT EDITION).

This book takes these two quotations as its starting point. Its subject matter covers some of the more important financial decisions that face companies; principally, investment, financing and dividend decisions, together with the management of risk. These are areas of vital importance to companies because they represent the main ways by which firms can enhance the value for their owners. This importance is reflected in the fact that corporate finance is a standard element of virtually all undergraduate and postgraduate courses that are concerned with business and management, as well as being a prominent element in professional accountancy examinations.

It is with all these groups of people in mind that this book has been written. However, it is hoped that practising financial managers will also find its contents of interest, in that it may help to provoke thoughtful reflection on how financial decisions should be and are actually made.

The book's origins lie in the courses taught at various universities and business schools around the world at both undergraduate and postgraduate level and in the courses taught to students studying for professional accountancy qualifications. In many ways this is not *my* book but my *students*' book. Their searching questions have often prompted me to think through the subject matter in greater depth and to seek out alternative ways of providing clear and full explanations of the subject matter. This is not an easy book, but patience and application will be richly rewarded with understanding.

This new edition closely retains the format of the previous edition, but contains many amendments, clarifications and corrections in order to improve the overall 'learning experience' of the reader. Its objective is to provide a clear, thoughtful and systematic analysis of the key elements of corporate finance theory through a non-academic writing style and plenty of illustrative numerical examples.

It is all too easy for authors to lose sight of just how difficult some topics can be to the new reader. Familiarity, if not exactly breeding contempt, can sometimes lead to an overconcise exposition of the subject being discussed. Hopefully this pitfall has been avoided, so that the changes made further enhance the book's clarity of presentation of what is quite a challenging subject matter.

The purpose of the Learning Objectives is to provide the reader with a 'road map' of what is to come in each chapter; while the summaries are designed to give an overview of the key areas that have been discussed in each chapter and to provide a snapshot of the main points. The suggested further reading has been compiled with particular emphasis on providing articles that are, in the main, accessible to those readers who do not possess a higher degree in mathematics! The quiz questions are to test both recall and understanding and to give the reader essential feedback – the quiz answers are tucked away at the back of the book, in order to reduce the temptation to cheat! Finally, the end-of-chapter exam-style problems have been selected to try and cover the major elements of each chapter's subject matter. The answers to many of these problems are available to students on the accompanying online platform. However, some are only available to course lecturers.

'Real World Views' feature boxes are interspersed throughout the text to help put theories and concepts into context, to present differing views from economies around the world and to invoke group debate. In this new edition, these have been carefully and thoughtfully updated by Angus Smith, with my thanks.

As I have said right from the start of the original edition, it should be made clear that this is not a 'how-to-do-it' book of corporate financial management. Such a book is not really possible in the complex, practical and ever-changing area of corporate finance. Instead, it is an attempt at a fairly detailed, reasoned discussion of the *normative theory* of corporate finance. Where examples have used real-world data, they are there for the purposes of exposition, rather than to encourage unthinking application of the theory to practical decision-making. It is not the aim to put forward theoretical solutions to practical problems, but to promote thought and reflection on how decisions are made and, perhaps, how they can be improved.

As far as possible, the presentation has been argued in descriptive and graphical terms rather than using a strict mathematical analysis. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, a mathematical treatment often excludes a great many potential enquirers and reduces the subject matter to a degree of terseness that makes unrealistic demands upon the concentration of the reader. Second, a mathematical treatment, although often rather elegant, can sometimes fail to make clear the full significance of important conclusions. However, it has been impossible to exclude mathematics completely – indeed it would have been counterproductive to do so in some areas – but its complexity has been kept to an absolute minimum. The derivation of formulae and relationships 'just for the sake' of it has been resisted and only occurs where the mathematical derivation leads to a greater understanding for the reader.

All that remains is to thank all the people at the publishers, Cengage, and in particular to Editorial Assistant Hayley Wallbridge, for all their help, understanding and general prodding to get the new edition finished and onto the bookshelves. Most of all, my thanks go to students everywhere who make writing and teaching so enjoyable! Anyway, time now to walk the dogs...

Steve Lumby 2018

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
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
WALK-THROUGH TOUR



Learning Objectives – Listed at the start of each chapter, these provide the reader with a 'road map' of what is to come in each chapter.




Numbered Figures and Tables – Clearly set out on the page, to aid the reader with quick conceptualization.



Examples and Scenarios – Examples and scenarios are dispersed throughout the text to illustrate practical application.




Real World Views – Boxes throughout help to provide context of application in practice and relevant developments in the real world.




Summary – The end of each chapter has a summary designed to give an overview of the key areas that have been discussed, and to provide a snapshot of the main points.




Notes – Useful end-of-chapter notes provide helpful additional information and clarification.




Appendix – Some chapters have an appendix, containing additional useful information.



Further Reading – Provide helpful directions to further sources of information, compiled with particular emphasis on providing articles that are, in the main, accessible to those readers who do not possess a higher degree in mathematics.




Quiz Questions – Included at the end of every chapter, these test both recall and understanding and give the reader essential feedback.



Answers to Quiz Questions – Helpfully provided at the back of the book to enable students to easily test themselves.




Problems – Exam-style questions which cover the major elements of each chapter's subject matter – some answers are included on the students' online platform, whilst others go on the lecturers' side only.



Answers to Problems – The majority of answers to the exam question-style problems are available to students online, though some lecturer-only answers are on the lecturers' password protected website.



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- An open-access area for students including, for example, useful weblinks and glossary terms.

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BE UNSTOPPABLE





INTRODUCTION

- 1. Financial decision-making
- 2. Decision objectives

1

FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this chapter is to:

- Identify the elements that make up the decision process.
- Introduce the objective of financial management decision-making as the maximization of shareholder value.
- Translate this theoretical objective onto the basis of maximizing the value of that company's shares, through maximizing the cash flow to shareholders over time.
- Argue that the more traditional financial objective of accounting profit maximization is inappropriate within the context of financial decision-making.

THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS

An overview

This book covers a particular area of managerial economics: the theory of financial decision-making by business corporations. It is concerned with how management within companies should make financial decisions, and so it can be said to adopt a normative approach because it sets out to establish a standard or norm. But such a theory cannot hope to succeed in its task if it is developed in isolation from what actually does happen in practice, and so we shall also examine how financial decisions *are* made in practice, in order to guide and enrich the development of our normative approach.

The value base

Financial decisions are no different in their fundamental aspects from other decisions of a non-financial nature. In essence, all decisions are based on the concept of the comparison

of alternatives, and it is in this sense that the theory of financial decisions really has its roots in valuation theory, because all the alternatives in any decision-making situation have to be valued in order to be compared. Therefore, although we can say that all types of decisions involve the same fundamental process, each is given its own unique characteristics by the valuation base that it employs.

The financial decision theory developed in this book is founded on the valuation bases that come from the idea of a competitive market economy. However, many parts of our financial theory will be applicable to other types of economic organization, and you may wish to consider and reflect upon the implications of our theory for more social value bases, such as those that might be appropriate to organizations that are within the public sector.

The 'model' approach and the structure of the text

This book is structured in five parts:

- 1. Introduction to the context of financial decisions Chapters 1 and 2.
- 2. The capital investment decision Chapters 3 to 8.
- 3. The impact of uncertainty on financial decisions Chapters 9 to 14.
- 4. Financing decisions Chapters 15 to 21.
- 5. Financial decisions in an international context Chapters 22 to 24.

In the course of our development of a normative approach to financial decisions, a considerable number of abstractions from and simplifications of the 'real world' will be made, in order to distil the difficulties and focus attention on areas of major importance.

Adopting this type of 'modelling' approach is normal in the study of economics and related areas. However, it brings with it a danger that it is seen as fully describing a 'real' world and providing simple solutions to real-world problems. It is important to remember that we are developing a normative theory and are therefore attempting to give advice on how financial decisions *should* be taken. In general, we will work with simplified models and if the theory were to be followed in practice, without recognizing the full range of possible complicating factors, the quality of financial decisions made in business might deteriorate rather than improve.

The difficulties caused by taxation, inflation and capital scarcity will all be taken into account, as will the concept of risk and the fact that the future is uncertain. These real-world complexities will be added layer by layer to the simplified model with which we start. Even though that model might be a poor reflection of the real world, it provides a logically sound framework upon which to build.

A warning

As a final point, the reader should be constantly aware that the theory of financial decisions presented here is neither in a state of general detailed agreement, nor does it yet provide complete solutions to many of the important problems of financial decision-making. In order to reflect this state of affairs, we shall examine the causes and evidence of these controversies and point out the irrationalities, ambiguities and inconsistencies that necessarily accompany the development of any theory that aspires to real-world application.

THE DECISION PROCESS

In order to examine the decision process and to answer the question, 'How do we make a decision?', we have first to discuss the circumstances in which a decision needs to be made. We can specify two necessary conditions for a decision situation: the existence of alternatives and the existence of an objective or goal.

The first necessary condition

The existence of alternatives is necessary because, if there are no alternatives from which to choose, then there is no need for a decision. This condition can be specified further in that not only must alternatives exist, but they must be seen to exist by the potential decision-maker. There are two points of interest here.

First, notice that we talk of a decision *situation* and of a *potential* decision-maker. This is because the mere existence of perceived alternatives does not necessarily mean that a decision will be made. For instance, the potential decision-maker may well procrastinate, and therefore the passage of time takes him (or her) out of a decision situation and into a situation where there is only one possible course of action and no alternatives are available. (Death is the ultimate example of the passage of time removing a decision situation from an individual.)

The second point of interest is that we are *not* specifying that all possible alternatives are perceived; if they were, we could call this an optimal decision situation. We are, rather, examining how decisions are made, given that a particular decision situation exists. Whether the decision is truly optimal or non-optimal is of no concern at present.

The second necessary condition

The second necessary condition for a decision situation arises from the fact that the actual process of 'making a decision' is liable to cause the decision-maker to expend both time and effort. Rational decision-makers will be unwilling to do so unless they expect that some of the perceived alternatives will be preferred to others in relation to attaining the desired objective. Thus, the existence of an objective is the second necessary condition: without it, there will be no purpose in making a decision.¹

Valuation of alternatives

Together, these two necessary conditions provide the rationale for making decisions: if the decision-maker does not perceive alternatives, or sees no reason to choose between the alternatives if they are perceived, then no decision will be made (except one of a totally arbitrary kind, as in note 1). But once these conditions do exist, a decision cannot actually be made until values are placed upon the alternatives. In fact, we can assert that the only reason why any alternative course of action is ever evaluated is in order to make a decision about it; therefore, the valuation method used must be related to the objective involved in making the decision and the way in which that objective is expressed.

For example, if our objective were to drive from A to B in the shortest possible time, then we should value the alternative routes from A to B by a common value criterion that was related to our objective of time, and choose whichever route took the shortest time.

Suppose there were three alternative routes: one we valued by time, one by distance and one by scenic beauty. We obviously could not make a decision because the alternatives have different measures or yardsticks of value and so cannot be compared. Alternatively, if all three routes were measured in terms of scenic beauty, we should again be unable to make a decision, even though we could compare the routes, because the basis of the comparison is not the one that gives the rationale for the decision: the value base of the objective, which in this example is 'time'.²

Therefore, any decision-making process consists of these three components: a series of perceived alternatives, an expectation that these alternatives are not all equally desirable in terms of attaining an objective held by the decision-maker, and a common value base related to the decision objective. So it is with all financial decisions made in business.

FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING

This book focuses attention on only two of the three components that we have identified in the decision process and examines how they relate to the making of financial decisions: the expectation that the perceived alternatives are not all equally desirable in terms of attaining a specific objective, and the common value base that is related to this objective and is used to compare the alternatives.

The remaining component of the decision process is the series of perceived alternatives. We shall not be examining it in the main body of the text as it is primarily a condition for the decision *situation*, and we are concentrating on the actual decision-making, assuming that the decision situation already exists. However, this omission does not mean that the 'search process' (as it is called) for alternatives is unimportant. It is in fact extremely important. If this search process is not efficient in seeking out alternatives, then there is a grave danger that the decision itself will not be optimal because the 'most preferred' alternative may go unperceived.

The decision objective

Turning to the two decision process components that we shall examine in detail, we immediately become involved in a value judgement, because the objective we use for financial decision-making, and the consequent value base, will determine the decision reached as to which alternative is selected. Therefore, what objective are we going to use and what valuation base are we going to set up for our theory of financial decisions?

We stated earlier that the fundamental value judgement upon which our approach is based is the concept of a market economy. In such economies, it is reasonable to assume that companies exist for one overriding purpose: in order to benefit their owners. While companies provide income for their employees and the wider local community, supply the needs of a particular market, and provide other benefits such as technological advance, the fact remains that the fundamental rationale for their existence must be to bring benefit to their owners.

This rationale for existence undoubtedly holds true for the great majority of privately owned companies and so management's objective in making financial decisions should be to further the very reason for the company's existence, of benefiting the owners, i.e. the shareholders. We shall see that there might be other managerial objectives but, in essence, we will treat those as deviating from what they should be (this is consistent with the idea of adopting a normative approach). So, if the decision objective is to benefit the owners, what is the value base to be used for the comparison of alternatives?

To answer this question, we have to examine the decision objective more closely. It is obvious from what we have already said that not only should company managements make financial decisions so as to benefit the owners (their shareholders), but they should also strive to maximize that benefit, otherwise shareholders will be interested in replacing them with a set of decision-makers who will do this. Therefore, what is meant by the term 'maximizing shareholders' benefit'?

Maximizing shareholder value

We are going to assume that maximizing benefit means maximizing 'value' or 'wealth'. Although there is nothing surprising about this, we have to be careful here because we are going to assume that maximizing the increase in the owners' value is the *only* way in which management decisions can benefit owners.

This is a slight simplification of the real world, because it is quite possible for shareholders to gain benefit from a company other than by increases in value. For example, shareholders of a company such as the UK property development company, Land Securities plc, may gain benefit from ownership in terms of pride in the fact that the company has a proactive stance towards protecting the environment for which it has won awards. This is also reflected in various ethical investment funds, which emphasize the virtuous, rather than wealth-generating, properties of their investments. However, despite the growing interest in environmental issues, we shall proceed on the assumption that increase in shareholder value is the main, if not the sole, source of benefit from company ownership.

Should we be concerned about companies selling military arms to countries that have repugnant policies, or firms causing pollution to land, air or water resources? Do these types of activity enter into consideration of our decision objective? On the basis of our underlying assumption about the nature of the economy, our answer must be that they should not, because if these activities were thought to be truly undesirable, governments would legislate or regulate to constrain companies' decision-choice alternatives so as to exclude them (as in many cases they do). Company decision-makers should only need to perceive and analyze the decision alternatives in terms of maximizing the owners' wealth. From this viewpoint we can treat financial decisions as not being anything to do with morality. Morality, the law and other considerations might act as a constraint on what a company does but they are entirely different issues and are generally assessed using different criteria.

In market economies, we can develop a theory of financial decisions for privately owned firms in this way because of the workings of the market system for company finance. Share capital, the substance of ownership, is normally provided through supply and demand markets (e.g. stock exchanges), which means that potential shareholders can buy shares in companies that they expect will provide them with the greatest possible increase in value (i.e. shareholders have to make financial decisions in much the same way as management, choosing between alternative ownership opportunities). Existing shareholders can sell their shares if they see other companies providing greater increases to their owners' value than they are receiving. (An important concept here, and one we have yet to deal with, is that the future is uncertain and so any decision amongst alternatives usually has a risk attached to it: the risk that the alternative chosen may not turn out as expected. Some alternatives are riskier than others and so shareholders will really want to own companies that they expect will give them the greatest possible increase in value, for a given level of risk. This concept will be considered more fully at a later stage.) Therefore, if a company were to make its decisions on a basis other than that of maximizing shareholder value, the whole rationale for the company's existence – so far as shareholders are concerned – would be in doubt and they would be likely to take their investment funds elsewhere. In the extreme case, company law provides the opportunity for shareholders to replace a company's decision-makers if enough of them believe that decisions are not being taken in their best interests.

REAL WORLD VIEW: The Rise of Shareholder Revolts

Shareholder 'revolts' are becoming increasingly commonplace. They often occur when senior management are considered to be rewarding themselves too generously at the expense of shareholders, especially if profits are down. Another frequent cause of revolt is when shareholders collectively believe poor management decisions will have a detrimental impact on the future of the company and its ongoing worth.

In terms of shareholder revolts caused by poor decision making, in March 2017 supermarket chain Tesco faced opposition from its two biggest shareholders, Schroders and Artisan Partners. Having just agreed to pay £214 million to settle a three year accounting scandal, shareholders opposed Tesco's proposed £3.7 billion acquisition of food wholesaler Booker Group Plc. Tesco's initial performance on the FTSE 100 index following the announcement of the Booker Group deal was poor, reflecting shareholder views that Tesco would be overpaying and causing the CEO further distraction.

Similarly, in January 2017, retailer Sports Direct also faced a shareholder revolt based on poor management decisions. In this case the chairman, Sir Keith Hellawell, was the centre of the rebellion. The company had been under intense pressure over the preceding 18 months due to a scandal about workers' conditions. Advisory groups such as the Institutional Shareholder Services were urging independent investors to vote against Sir Keith Hellawell's reappointment, due to repeated poor management. Despite a second vote and 54% of independent shareholders voting against him, with the support of chief executive Mike Ashely, Hellawell survived.

A classic example of a shareholder revolt against levels of executive pay is the revolt against global advertising firm WPP in 2016. 33% of investors voted to reject a new £70 million pay package for chief executive Sir Martin Sorrell, who is already the highest paid CEO of British FTSE 100 companies. His pay had risen at twice the year on year average

increase in the company's total shareholder return and discontent was reflected in the rise from 22% to 33% of shareholders voting against the pay package.

Another example of a company facing a share-holder revolt over executive pay where the proposed plan was ultimately left unchanged is Crest Nicholson, one of the UK's largest house building firms. More than 58% of shareholders voted against a pay deal for top executives because they felt company profit targets were too easy to achieve. Despite the embarrassment of being the first major revolt in 2017, the company still plans to go ahead with the pay deals.

Executive pay plans do not always survive shareholder revolts as with WPP and Crest Nicholson. In February 2017, 32.7% of Thomas Cook shareholders voted to reject a planned 225% rise in CEO Peter Fankhauser's long term bonus, worth about £1.6 million a year. A further 20% of shareholders rejected the firm's overall pay policy. In response to this, Thomas Cook reduced the maximum payout for its chief executive. The share price dropped by 7.5% on this announcement amidst a tough period for the company.

Whether payment plans are changed or not, sometimes shareholders revolt against executive pay purely based on the performance of the company at the time. Mining company Anglo American announced a cap on executive bonuses in March 2017, following a revolt over high payouts after the company's stock price had crashed in 2016. The CEO's maximum bonus was reduced from 350% to 300% of basic salary to bring it into line with other executives.

A similar revolt took place at global investor Franklin Templeton after a terrible performance in 2016. Despite managing assets worth £1.5 trillion, it was the worst selling fund house globally in 2016, with assets depreciating by 5%, revenues dropping 16.7% to \$6.4 billion and operating income falling by 21.8% in 2016. Excessive pay and lack of director independence were the main reasons cited by shareholders for the revolt.

Defining value

However, we still cannot determine the valuation base for financial decision-making until we have defined 'shareholder value', because the purpose of the valuation base is to act as a common denominator with which to make the alternative courses of action directly

comparable and to see which one leads furthest towards the decision objective. As the objective of financial decisions is assumed to be to 'maximize the increase in shareholders' value', let us define 'value' and so determine the valuation base.

Shareholder value (or shareholder wealth), can be defined as the capacity to consume and can be simply measured in terms of money or cash. Thus, the objective of management becomes the maximization of shareholders' purchasing power, which can be achieved by maximizing the amount of cash paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends. But *which* dividends should a company's management try to maximize: this year's, next year's or what?

The point here is that it would be a relatively easy task for a company to maximize a single year's dividend, simply by selling up all the assets and paying a final liquidation dividend! Obviously, this is not what is meant by our decision objective of maximizing dividends, and the trouble arises through the omission of the time dimension. When fully defined, including the time dimension, the objective of a company's financial decision-makers becomes the maximizing of the *flow* of dividends to shareholders *over time*.

The role of accounting profit

There are two points of fundamental importance that arise from the development of this decision objective. First, the word 'profit' has not been mentioned and the emphasis has been laid on value defined as cash. Second, the introduction of the time dimension means that decisions must be analyzed not only in terms of immediate cash gains and losses, but also in terms of *future* gains and losses.

These two points are interlinked. Profit, when used in a business sense, is a concept developed by financial accountants in order to assist them with their reporting functions, performed on behalf of shareholders.

The accounting profit metric has been developed over very many years and arises out of the concept of the 'stewardship' function. It was designed as a means of providing evidence that the individuals who were tasked with managing the assets of others (the company's management team), had done so both diligently and responsibly. This stewardship principle still lies at the heart of the accounting profit metric. However, although annual company financial reports are produced each year and contain the 'profit' calculation, this should not be interpreted as being a measure of the increase in shareholder value over the year. Annual financial profit calculation is produced using a number of conventions and judgements which results in 'profit' and 'cash' becoming different concepts. As we will see, wealth, worth and value are all concepts related to the future (and to future cash flows) but accounting profit is related to the past.

Financial decisions are basically economic or resource allocation decisions. Management has to decide whether they should allocate the firm's scarce resources (land, labour, machinery, etc.) to a particular project. In such decisions the economic 'unit of account' is cash, not accounting profit, because it is cash which gives power to command resources (i.e. resources are purchased with cash, not profit). Thus, to use the accounting profit concept in financial decision-making would be to use an entirely inappropriate concept – as it is a concept that has been specially developed for reporting the *outcome* of decisions, rather than having been developed for helping to take the actual decision itself.

However, we cannot discard the accounting profit concept completely. To do so would be rather like a sports team whose policy is that they do not mind whether they win or lose, so long as in playing they give maximum entertainment to their supporters. This is fine, and it is probably the correct attitude, but often it is on the winning or losing that the success of the team is ultimately judged and therefore that part of the game cannot be ignored. So

it is with accounting profit. The company's financial decision-makers should have as their major concern the maximization of the flow of cash through time to the shareholders, but they should always do so with an eye to reported profit. Profitability, as expressed in annual financial reports, forms a major criterion by which shareholders and prospective shareholders judge a company's success and, as we shall see later, it is important that people do form correct judgements about a company's performance.

Therefore, with the exception of this proviso, we can say that the financial decision theory developed here is built on an analytical framework that is largely devoid of the accounting profit concept, although it would be correct to assume that, in the longer run, good company cash flows will result in good reported profits.

The time dimension

Turning to the second point of importance in our decision objective, we have to return to our discussion on value.

Any asset (such as a machine or a share in a company) is valued on the basis of the future gains, or losses, that the owner expects to receive. Furthermore, these gains and losses do not refer to just those made in a single time period, but to the whole period of future time for which the asset will exist. (This concept is sometimes referred to as the asset's earning power.)

Let us consider an asset of company ownership: a single share. Shares are traded (i.e. bought and sold) in supply and demand markets (stock markets), and so a share's market valuation represents an equilibrium value, a value at which demand for the share by people who wish to buy it equates with the supply of the share by people who wish to sell it. But what process actually gives a share its equilibrium price, what makes prospective purchasers wish to buy it at that price and what makes prospective sellers willing to sell it at that price? Let us examine the prospective purchaser's reasons.

Suppose a share of Jeddah Company has a stock market price of $\[\in \]$ 25. Prospective owners of that share would only be willing to buy it if they thought it was worth $\[\in \]$ 25. In other words, they would expect that the gains to be received from ownership would have a value of at least $\[\in \]$ 25.

These gains of ownership consist of two elements: the stream of dividends received for as long as the share is owned, and the selling price received when the share is eventually sold (and so ownership relinquished) at some future point in time. However, it is important to note that this future selling price of the Jeddah share is itself based on the value the *succeeding* owner, in turn, puts on the benefits expected to be received from ownership – the dividend flow received and the selling price that they will receive upon selling the share at some future point in time. So the process goes on ad infinitum. Therefore, although there are two benefits of ownership, the dividends received and the future selling price, this latter benefit is itself determined by the flow of dividends expected to be generated by the share subsequent to its sale.

Given this argument, our theory will assume that shares derive their stock market price on the basis of the sum of the complete future dividend flow that they will produce through time. (As the future is uncertain, it is more correct to talk of valuation based on the *expected* dividend flow, but we shall return to this later.) Thus, the greater the future dividend flow, the more highly are the shares valued. Therefore, if our financial decision-makers are taking decisions so as to maximize dividend flow through time, then, via the direct link between dividend flow and a share's market price, this action will result in the *maximization of the market value of the company's shares*. It is this that we shall take as being the operational objective of financial management decision-making.⁵